In economics, we have many terms to describe different types of equilibrium, in both macroeconomics and microeconomics concept. When there is an equilibrium, no one would like to change their strategies (it is often referred as Nash Equilirbium in a pure strategy game). In the reality, we often change our actions very easily and randomly (as we could simply change our behaviours according to our mood). The major problems in the reality are imperfect information and incomplete information. Moreover, because of the costs of information, we have different probabilities to having control of determinant information, that would influence our behaviour. Communication is also costly that it is much easier to collude with people that are closer to them than to collude with the entire market. This will lead to many blocked collusions within the market. Such outcome is very likely to be less efficient than the outcome without blocked collusion. However, when we take into account of the costs of communication and coodination, the outcome of the market with blocked collusion would be more efficient if people do not form individual collusion within the market.
Therefore, the current outcome may be the most possible efficient at the moment, given the existence of communication and coordination costs.
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